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1 Introduction
In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to define a solution for the game, that
is, assuming that all players decide to collaborate and form the grand coalition N , how to
share among players the total benefit of the cooperation v(N) (or, if it is a cost game, the
total cost) so that every player is satisfied in some sense? Many kinds of solution concepts
have been proposed, among them the Shapley value [21], the bargaining set of Aumann and
Maschler [2], the kernel of Davis and Maschler [7, 8], the nucleolus of Schmeidler [20], etc.,
but the most popular one is the core [13]. Roughly speaking, the core is the set of solutions
so that no coalition receives less than the amount it could have obtained by itself. It has
been studied by many authors and has remarkable properties. In particular, when the game
is convex, its structure is completely determined.
In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is assumed that any coalition can
form, without any restriction. This strong assumption is rarely satisfied in practice, since
the cooperation of players can be constrained in many respects (communication, personal
incompatibilities, hierarchy, and so on). Therefore, many authors have proposed various
ways to escape this strong assumption, mainly by imposing some convenient mathematical
structure on the set of coalitions which can form, called feasible coalitions: distributive
lattices (Faigle [11]), convex geometries (Bilbao and Edelman [4]), antimatroids (Algaba et
al. [1]), augmenting systems (Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez [3]), which have their respective merits
and interpretations. Recently, Honda and Grabisch [15] (see also Lange and Grabisch [16])
have proposed regular set systems. Roughly speaking, a regular set system is a collection of
coalitions containing the grand coalition and the empty set, such that any maximal sequence
ordered by inclusion (called hereafter a maximal chain) from the empty coalition to N
has exactly |N | nonempty coalitions, like for example, with N = {1, 2, 3}, the sequence
∅, {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}. Clearly, these maximal sequences correspond to permutations of N ,
that is, total orders on players. In the classical case, any permutation is possible (that is, the
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players can enter the game in any order), leading to the regular set system 2N , the set of all
possible coalitions. However, for a regular set system, some permutations may be forbidden.
Taking again the case of N = {1, 2, 3}, the collection {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} is
a regular set system, where among the 6 possible permutations, only 1, 3, 2 and 2, 3, 1 are
permitted. Another interesting interpretation of regular set systems is given by Lange and
Grabisch [16]: if feasible coalitions correspond to connected components in a communication
graph, as proposed by Myerson [17], then the set of feasible coalitions forms a regular set
system, provided N itself is connnected. The converse is however not true, which means
that regular set systems are more general. Also, it has been proved in [16] that distributive
lattices, convex geometries and antimatroids are particular cases of regular set systems.
The problem of studying the core of games defined on a set of feasible coalitions which
is not 2N is often difficult. The core has been studied for most of the above cited structures
(see, e.g., Faigle [11], Derks and Gilles [9] for set systems closed under union and intersection,
Grabisch and Xie [14] for distributive lattices,. . . ) and is often unbounded. The existence of
vertices and rays for the core on arbitrary set systems has been studied through the concept
of core of a set system by Derks and Reijnierse [10]. We mention also Pulido and Sa´nchez-
Soriano [19], who use the notion of core of a set system, but for axiomatization purpose. Our
paper aims at studying the core for games on regular set systems. For the sake of generality,
and to recover the case of set systems closed under union and intersection of Derks and
Gilles, we slightly weaken the definition of regular set systems, saying that any maximal
sequence from the empty set to N should have a fixed number k of nonempty coalitions, k
being at most |N |. We call such set systems k-regular set systems, and regular set systems
are |N |-regular set systems. This generalization allows players to enter the game by groups,
instead of being obliged to enter one by one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic material for games on
k-regular set systems. Section 3 recalls the main results known for the core for classical
cooperative games on 2N . The study of the core begins in Section 4 by establishing general
results (nonemptiness, general form of rays and vertices), some of them of more algorithmic
nature are put in the appendix. Then Section 5 is more particularly devoted to the study
of vertices, while Section 6 addresses the case of convex games. A final section makes
comparison with results obtained by the authors for games on distributive lattices, and
concludes the paper.
2 Basic concepts and notations
Throughout this paper, we consider a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}. Subsets of N are
called coalitions. The grand coalition is N itself. For simplicity, we often omit braces and
commas for denoting subsets, e.g., v(12) instead of v({1, 2}).
Consider a coalition S. The characteristic vector eS ∈ {0, 1}
n of S is defined by (eS)i = 1
if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. Following our convention, we denote by ei the characteristic vector
of the singleton i.
Let R be a collection of subsets of N , called the set of feasible coalitions. If R embodies
2
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∅{1}
{1, 2, 3}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 4}
{2}
Figure 1: R = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
∅ and N , we call it a set system on N . A set system can be considered as a partially ordered
set (or poset) with set-inclusion ”⊆” as a partial order [6]. First, we recall some concepts
about set systems.
Let R be a set system with a partial order ⊆. Let S, T ∈ R and S ⊆ T . If there is
no R ∈ R, such that S ( R ( T , we say that T covers S, denoted by S ≺ T . If there
exist S1, S2, . . . , Sk ∈ R, such that S ≺ S1 ≺ S2 ≺ . . . ≺ Sk = T , we say that the sequence
S, S1, S2, . . . , Sk is a maximal chain from S to T , and the length of this maximal chain is k.
Denote the set of all maximal chains from S to T of R by CS−T (R). We define the supremum
S ∨ T of S, T as the least element in R which is greater than S and T , and the infimum
S ∧ T of S, T as the greatest element in R which is less than S and T . Clearly, ∅ and N are
the least and greatest elements of R. The collection of all maximal chains from ∅ to N is
denoted by C(R).
Definition 1 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n. A set system is k-regular if all maximal chains from ∅ to N
have the same length k.
For example, {∅, {1}, {1, 2}, {2}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} is a 3-regular set system. In [15, 16],
n-regular set systems are called regular set systems.
A consequence of the definition is that in a k-regular set system Rk, for any S, T ∈ Rk,
all maximal chains from S to T have the same length. Hence, it makes sense to define the
height function h: for any S ∈ Rk, h(S) is the length of a maximal chain from ∅ to S. This
induces levels in the set system (subsets of same height), and we say that the set system is
ranked (by h).
A set lattice on N is a set system on N in which any two subsets have a supremum and
an infimum. We can call set lattices simply lattices without confusion. Not all set systems
are lattices, e.g, R = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} (see Figure 1) is a set system
but not a lattice. A lattice R is distributive if the operations ∨,∧ are mutually distributive.
Any distributive lattice is ranked. If a set system R is closed under ∪,∩ as in Derks and
Gilles [9], then clearly R is a distributive lattice with ∨ = ∪ and ∧ = ∩, but the converse is
not true.
Let P be a partially ordered set with partial order ≤. A downset of P is a subset S of P
such that, if x ∈ S, then y ≤ x implies y ∈ S. We denote the collection of downsets of P by
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O(P ). It is a distributive set lattice on P closed under union and intersection. Conversely,
for any distributive lattice R, there exists a poset P with partial order ≤ such that O(P )
is isomorphic to R (we say that P generates R). When P = N , we recover the definition
of distributive games [14] (see Definition 3 (i)), and games under precedence constraints
[11, 12]. The next lemma and Figure 2 summarize the above facts and clarify the relative
situation of the main families of set systems used in the paper.
Lemma 1 Let R be a distributive set lattice on N of height k.
(i) R is a k-regular set system, which is generated by a poset P of k elements.
(ii) R is closed under union and intersection if and only if R is isomorphic to O(P ), where
P can be chosen as a partition of N .
(iii) k = n if and only if R is isomorphic to O(N).
Proof We only prove the “only if” part of (ii), since the rest is clear from definitions, and
(iii) from (ii). Since R is closed under ∪,∩, it is a distributive lattice with k join-irreducible
subsets J1, . . . , Jk (see, e.g., [6]). Define the family of subsets
Pj := Jj \ {Jℓ | Jℓ ⊂ Jj}, j = 1, . . . , k.
Define the poset (P,≤) by P = {P1, . . . , Pk} and Pi ≤ Pj iff Ji ⊆ Jj. Hence ({J1, . . . , Jk},⊆)
and (P,≤) are isomorphic, and they generate the same downsets. Consequently R is iso-
morphic to O(P ). Note also that for any S ∈ R, we have S =
⋃
i|Ji⊆S
Ji =
⋃
i|Ji⊆S
Pi, so we
can write (with slight abuse) R = O(P ). It remains to show that P is a partition of N .
Since N =
⋃k
i=1 Ji =
⋃k
i=1 Pi, clearly P must be a covering of N . It remains to show
that the subsets P1, . . . , Pk are pairwise disjoint. Assume on the contrary that Pj and Pj′
intersect, say i ∈ Pj ∩ Pj′. Then i ∈ Jj and i 6∈ Jℓ, for all Jℓ ⊂ Jj , and similarly for Jj′.
Remark that any S ∈ R such that S ⊂ Jj does not contain i (because such a S is the
union of some Jℓ’s included in Jj), and the same holds for S ⊂ Jj′. However, since R is
closed under intersection, we must have Jj ∩ Jj′ ∈ R, which is a subset of Jj containing i, a
contradiction. 
As explained in the proof, in cases (ii) and (iii), we may write that R = O(P ).
Definition 2 Let Rk be a k-regular set system. A game on Rk is a mapping v : Rk → R
such that v(∅) = 0. We denote the set of all these games on Rk by G(Rk).
Some particular cases are of interest.
Definition 3 Let v be a game on a k-regular set system Rk.
(i) If Rk is a distributive lattice O(N) induced by some order on N (and in this case
k = n), then v is called a distributive game on N .
(ii) If v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S, T ∈ Rk such that S ⊆ T , we say that v is monotone.
4
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set lattices
k-regular set systems, 1 ≤ k ≤ n
distributive lattices
closed under ∪,∩
1 ≤ k < n
O(N), k = n
Figure 2: The relative position of set lattices and k-regular set systems on N
(iii) Suppose in addition that Rk is a lattice. We say that the game is convex, if ∀S, T ∈
Rk, v(S ∨ T ) + v(S ∧ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
Let x := (xi)i∈N be an n-dimensional vector on R
n. x is called a payoff vector when every
xi for i ∈ N represents what the player i earns, like income, bonus, salary, etc. The core is
defined as the set of payoff vectors such that no feasible coalition receives less than that it
could achieve by itself.
Definition 4 Let Rk be a k-regular set system, v ∈ G(Rk). The core of v is defined by
C(v) := {x := (xi)i∈N ∈ R
n | x(S) :=
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ R
k and x(N) = v(N)}.
Let R be a set system on N . The core of R, introduced by Derks and Reijnierse [10], is
defined by
C(R) := {x := (xi)i∈N ∈ R
n | x(S) :=
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ 0 for all S ∈ R and x(N) = 0}.
It is the set of side payments which are not unfavourable to any coalition in R.
Since C(R) is always convex, then it is either a pointed cone or a linear subspace, or
both, i.e., it reduces to the singleton {0} (more on cones, rays and vertices in Section 4).
It is easy to see that, if the core of a given game on R is nonempty, then C(v) =
C(v) + C(R), that is, x + y ∈ C(v) for any x ∈ C(v), y ∈ C(R), and reciprocally, for any
z ∈ C(v) there exist x ∈ C(v), y ∈ C(R) such that x + y = z. Hence if the core of a given
game v on R is nonempty, we have
(i) C(R) is a pointed cone different from {0} if and only if C(v) has rays. Then C(R)
corresponds to the conic part of C(v).
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(ii) C(R) is a linear subspace different from {0}, i.e., C(R) contains lines, if and only if
C(v) has no vertices.
(iii) C(R) = {0} if and only if C(v) is a polytope.
3 A review of classical results
The classical definition of games is recovered when the set system is 2N , which is n-regular.
In this case, the condition of convexity simplifies into v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ),
for all S, T ⊆ N .
In the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆), a maximal chain between ∅ and N is of the form {∅ (
{i} ( {i, j} ( · · · ( N}, and hence is associated in a bijective way with a permutation π
on N , defining the order in which elements i, j, . . . appear. For any permutation π on N , we
define the maximal chain
Aπ0 := ∅ ( A
π
1 := {π(1)} ( A
π
2 := {π(1), π(2)} ( · · · ( A
π
n := N
with Aπi := {π(1), . . . , π(i)}. Let us define the marginal worth vector x
π(v) by:
xππ(i)(v) := v(A
π
i )− v(A
π
i−1), i = 1, . . . , n.
The set of all marginal worth vectors is denoted by M(v). The ith coordinate represents
the contribution of player i in the chain.
Let us denote by conv(A) the convex hull of the set A. For any convex set A, we denote
by Ext(A) the set of its extreme points.
A collection B of nonempty subsets of N is balanced if there exist positive coefficients
µ(S), S ∈ B, such that ∑
S:S∋i,S∈B
µ(S) = 1, ∀i ∈ N.
Any partition {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is a balanced collection, with coefficients µ(Pi) = 1, ∀i. A
game v is balanced if for every balanced collection B with coefficients µ(S), S ∈ B, it holds∑
S∈B
µ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N).
The core of v is defined as in Definition 4, with Rk = 2N .
The following proposition summarizes well-known results.
Proposition 1 [18] Let v be a game on N . The following holds.
(i) C(v) ⊆ conv(M(v)).
(ii) C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is balanced.
(iii) v is convex if and only if C(v) = conv(M(v)) (i.e., M(v) contains all vertices of the
core).
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4 General facts on the core
We begin by deriving a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core.
A balanced collection of Rk \ {∅} is a balanced collection in the classical sense (see Sec. 3)
whose elements are all in Rk \ {∅}.
Example 1 Let R3 = {∅, {1}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. The collection B1 = {{1},
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} is balanced, because we can take the following coefficients µ1({1}) =
µ1({2, 3, 4}) = µ1({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 0.5.
Definition 5 A game v on a k-regular set system Rk is balanced if for every balanced
collection B of elements of Rk \ {∅} with positive coefficients µ(S), S ∈ B, it holds∑
S∈B
µ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N).
By linear programming, we can show the following result (proof is omitted, since very
close to the classical one).
Proposition 2 A game on a k-regular set system has a nonempty core if and only if it is
balanced.
Assuming that the core is nonempty, by its definition it is a closed convex polyhedron.
We study its general structure in the rest of this section. We assume that the reader has
some familiarity with polyhedra and linear programming (see, e.g., V. Chva´tal [5]).
Let v be a game on a k-regular set system Rk, and put r := |Rk|. The elements of
the core of this game are all n-dimensional vectors x satisfying
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈
Rk and
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). This can be written under the form of a system Ax ≥ b where
A is a (r − 1) × n matrix, whose rows are characteristic vectors of the subsets S, x is an
n-column vector and b = (v(S))S∈Rk\{∅} is a (r − 1)-column vector:
A =

 1 · · · 0. . .
1 · · · 1

 , b =


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 , x =

 x1...
xn

 .
Recall that the last row (S = N) is in fact an equality, and that all variables x1, . . . , xn
are free (i.e., unbounded). The core is the set of solutions of this system. We know that
a vector x is a vertex of the core if and only if x is a basic feasible solution of the system
Ax ≥ b. By the fundamental theorem on polyhedra, the core of a game v can be written as
the Minkowski sum of a convex part CF (v) := conv
(
Ext(C(v))
)
and a conic part generated
by Ray
(
C(v)
)
, the set of rays (or basic feasible directions) of the core.
A vertex of the core being determined by a nonsingular subsystem of n equalities, no
vertex exists if rank(A) < n. In particular, there is no vertex if r − 1 < n. We therefore
assume in the rest of this section that r − 1 ≥ n.
7
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Adding slack variables yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , r − 2 into this system, it turns to
A∗ ·
(
x
y
)
= b
with y := (yj)j being a (r−2)-column vector, and A
∗ being the (r−1)×(n+r−2) augmented
matrix of A:
A∗ ·
(
x
y
)
=


1 · · · 0 −1 0 · · · 0 0
0 −1 · · · 0 0
· · · . . .
0 0 · · · 0 −1
1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0 0

×


x1
...
xn
y1
...
yr−2


=


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 . (1)
We have r − 1 basic variables and n− 1 nonbasic variables.
Proposition 3 Let v be a game on a k-regular set system Rk ⊆ 2N with N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The components of the rays of the core of v do not depend on v, but only on Rk.
Proof Any element x of the core satisfies the system A∗(x y)T = b. We know that the
rays are all particular solutions of the system A∗(x y)T = 0 with all nonbasic components
all equal to 0 but one. The result holds because the system A∗(x y)T = 0 depends only on
Rk, not on v. 
If (x∗, y∗) is a vertex of system (1), since any variable xi is free, it must be basic. Because
r−1 ≥ n, we must choose r−1−n variables yj as basic variables and let the n−1 nonbasic
variables yj being equal to 0. We can suppose that y
∗
r−n = 0, . . . , y
∗
r−2 = 0. It leads to


1 · · · 0 −1 0 · · · 0
· · · 0 −1 · · · 0
· · ·
...
. . .
· · · 0 0 · · · −1
1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0

×


x∗1
...
x∗n
y∗1
...
y∗r−1−n
0
...
0


=


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 .
The basic (r − 1)× (r − 1) matrix of A∗ can be written as
8
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n r − 1− n
r − 1− n
n


1 . . . 0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · −1
... 0
1 · · · 1

 =:
(
A1 C1
A2 0
)
,
that is, 

−1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · −1
... 0
1 · · · 1

×


x∗1
...
x∗n
y∗1
...
y∗r−1−n


=


v(1)
...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 .
Because the basic matrix is nonsingular, then A2 and C1 are nonsingular too. Using well-
known relations, we obtain

x∗1
...
x∗n
y∗1
...
y∗r−1−n


=
(
0 A−12
C−11 −C
−1
1 A1A
−1
2
)
×


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 .
Hence a basic feasible solution of this system can be written as (x1, · · · , xn, y1, · · · , yr−1−n,
0, · · · , 0, · · · , 0)T . It implies that a vertex of the core can be written as
(
0 A−12
)
×


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 .
Let us now determine the rays of the core. An algorithmic procedure to determine all
rays, which is a simplified version of the method given in Chva´tal [5], is described in the
Appendix. We remain in this section on a formal level. As above, let us suppose that the
basic variables are x1, · · · , xn, y1, · · · , yr−1−n. Hence a basic feasible direction has the form
9
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(x1, · · · , xn, y1, · · · , yr−1−n, 0, · · · ,
yj︷︸︸︷
1 , · · · , 0)T for some j ∈ {r − n, . . . , r − 2}. We have


1 0 −1 0 · · · 0
0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 · · · −1
1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0

×


x1
...
xn
y∗1
...
yr−1−n
0
...
1
...
0


= 0,
i.e.,
(
A1 C1
A2 0
)
×


x1
...
xn
y1
...
yr−1−n


=


0
...
1
...
0

 ← j ,
that is, 

x1
...
xn
y1
...
yr−1−n


=
(
0 A−12
C−11 −C
−1
1 A1A
−1
2
)
×


0
...
1
...
0

 ← j ,
with r − n ≤ j ≤ r − 2. Then

 x1...
xn

 = ( 0 A−12 )×


0
...
1
...
0

 ,
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
 y1...
yr−1−n

 = ( C−11 −C−11 A1A−12 )×


0
...
1
...
0

 .
If y1, . . . , yr−1−n ≥ 0, the vector (x, y)
T is a ray; otherwise denote the set of indices of all
yi < 0 by I. Let zi :=
y∗i
−yi
and k be the index of zk such that zk = mini∈I{zi}. Then the
variable yk leaves the basis and the variable yj enters the basis. It leads to another basic
feasible solution (x∗∗, y∗∗)T s.t.
(x∗∗, y∗∗) = (x∗∗1 , · · · , x
∗∗
n , y
∗∗
1 , · · · , y
∗∗
k−1, 0, y
∗∗
k+1, . . . , y
∗∗
r−1−n, 0, · · · , y
∗∗
j , · · · , 0)
T .
By choosing the indices of r − 1 − n basic variables yi and the position of yj which is
supposed to be equal to 1, we can find all basic feasible solutions with all free variables being
basic, and all rays. Denote all these basic feasible solutions by x1, . . . , xp and all rays by
r1, . . . , rq. The following theorem, which is a direct consequence of the fundamental theorem
on polyhedra, summarizes previous results.
Theorem 1 Let Ax ≥ b represent the core of a given balanced game v. Let

 x
i
1
...
xin

 = ( 0 A−12 )×


...
v(S)
...
v(N)

 ,

 r
i
1
...
rin

 = ( 0 A−12 )×


0
...
1
...
0

 ,
with A2 being any nonsingular submatrix of A, which contains the row vector (1, . . . , 1). A
vector x ∈ Rn belongs to the core if and only if x =
∑p
i=1 αix
i +
∑q
i=1 βir
i with
∑p
i=1 αi = 1
and αi, βj ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , p, j = 1, . . . , q.
The above theorem and the algorithm given in the Appendix permit to find all rays
and vertices of the core, when nonempty. It does not give however an explicit expression
of them. Derks and Gilles have given an explicit expressions of rays of the core in the
particular case where R is closed under union and intersection [9]. We introduce the notation
DRi :=
⋂
{S ∈ R | i ∈ S}, for any i ∈ N . Recall that rays of C(R) correspond to rays of
C(v).
Theorem 2 [9] Let R be a set system closed under ∪ and ∩. Then C(R) is the cone
generated by ej − ei with i ∈ N , j ∈ D
R
i , where ei is the characteristic vector of i.
Derks and Gilles have proved that such vectors ej − ei are always rays of the core, for any
set system.
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5 Vertices of the core
Assuming that the core is nonempty, we want to find conditions of existence of vertices of
the core, and analyze them.
5.1 Existence of vertices
First, we consider the following example.
Example 2 Let v be a game with three players on R = {∅, {1}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. The con-
ditions for x := (xi)i=1,2,3 to be an element of the core are:
∅
{1} {2, 3}
{1, 2, 3}
x1 ≥ v({1})
x2 + x3 ≥ v({2, 3})
x1 + x2 + x3 = v({1, 2, 3}).
Let v(∅) = 0, v({1}) = 1, v({2, 3}) = 1.5, v({1, 2, 3}) = 3. The vector x = (1, 2, 0) ∈ C(v) as
well as x + l(0,−1, 1) for any l ∈ R. That is, (0,−1, 1) is a line of C(v), i.e., the core has
no vertices.
This example shows that the core may be without vertices.
The next proposition shows that in case of distributive lattices, the core has always
vertices.
Proposition 4 Let v be a distributive game on R = O(N). Then, if the core of v is
nonempty, it has always some vertices.
Proof Let {∅, S1 := {i1}, · · · , Sn := N} be a maximal chain of R with Sj := {i1, i2, · · · , ij}.
We know that the core of v is the set of solutions of the system Ax ≥ b. Then, after changing
the order of variables of x, the submatrix of A corresponding to S1, · · · , Sn can be written
as i1 · · · in
S1
...
Sn

1 · · · 0... . . .
1 · · · 1

 .
Its rank is n, then the rank of A is n, and therefore the core has at least one vertex. 
The following result, due to Derks and Reijnierse, gives a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for having vertices. Let R be a set system. The span of R is defined as follows
span(R) :=
{
S ⊆ N | eS =
∑
T∈R
λT eT for some λT ∈ R
}
with eT =
∑
i∈T ei for all T ⊆ N .
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Definition 6 A set system R is called non-degenerate if the characteristic vectors eT , T ∈
R, span the whole allocation space RN , i.e., span(R) = 2N .
Theorem 3 [10] The core of a set system R is a pointed cone if and only if R is non-
degenerate.
Theorem 4 [10] The core of a set system R is a linear subspace if and only if R is balanced.
Hence, if a game v has a nonempty core, it has vertices if and only if R is non-degenerate,
and C(R) = {0} if and only ifR is non-degenerate and balanced. For example, if Rk includes
at least n− 1 singletons, the core has at least one vertex.
Remark 1 The following facts are noteworthy:
(i) The fact that the core of a game has vertices or no vertices, as well as the coordinates
of rays (if any), depends solely on the set system, not on the game (see Theorems 2
and 3, and Proposition 3).
(ii) The fact that the core of a game is empty or not depends mainly on the game (see
Proposition 2).
5.2 Marginal worth vectors and the Weber set
Assuming that the core is nonempty and has vertices, let us try to characterize them. In
the classical case, the marginal worth vectors play a key role for this. In our case, we
will need something slightly more general. Let Rk be a k-regular set system on N , v be
a game on Rk. Let C := {S0 = ∅ ≺ S1 ≺ · · · ≺ Sk = N} ∈ C(R
k). For any set
Si \ Si−1 := {si1, . . . , siji}, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , k, we define an n-dimensional real-valued vector
ψi,r := (ψi,r(j))j∈N ∈ R
n with i = 1, . . . , k, r ∈ Si \ Si−1 by
ψi,r = [v(Si)− v(Si−1)]er,
that is,
ψi,r(j) =
{
v(Si)− v(Si−1) if j = r
0 otherwise.
Hence for any two sets Si, Si−1, there are |Si \ Si−1| vectors ψ
i,r to be defined. For
any maximal chain C, we define some n-dimensional vectors ψC(r1,...,rk) ∈ Rn with ri ∈
Si \ Si−1 ∀i = 1, . . . , k by
ψC(r1,...,rk) := ψ1,r1 + ψ2,r2 + · · ·+ ψk,rk with ψi,ri = [v(Si)− v(Si−1)]eri .
There are |S1|× |S2 \S1|× · · ·× |Sk \Sk−1| possibilities. We denote the set of all possibilities
for (r1, . . . , rk) corresponding to a maximal chain C by R
C .
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In Example 2, we consider the maximal chain C := (S0 := ∅ ≺ S1 := {2, 3} ≺ S2 :=
{1, 2, 3}). We obtain:
ψ1,2 = (0, v(23), 0);
ψ1,3 = (0, 0, v(23));
ψ2,1 = (v(123)− v(23), 0, 0).
They lead to 2 possibilities for vectors ψC(r1,...,rk):
ψC(2,1) = ψ1,2 + ψ2,1 = (v(123)− v(23), v(23), 0);
ψC(3,1) = ψ1,3 + ψ2,1 = (v(123)− v(23), 0, v(23)).
Let C ∈ C(Rk), and let VC(v,Rk) denote the set of all possibilities for vectors ψC(r1,...,rk).
Let V(v,Rk) denote the set of all vectors ψC(r1,...,rk) for all maximal chains C and all r1, . . . , rk,
i.e., V(v,Rk) := ∪C∈C(Rk)V
C(v,Rk). By analogy with the classical case, we call marginal
worth vectors the elements of V(v,Rk), and we define the Weber set as the convex hull of
all marginal vectors:
W(v) := conv(V(v,Rk)).
It is easily to show that W(v) +W(u) ⊇ W(v + u) and C(v) + C(u) ⊆ C(v + u) for any two
given games v, u. We have
ψC(r1,...,rk)(N) =
k∑
i=1
ψi,ri(N) =
k∑
i=1
ψi,ri(ri) =
k∑
i=1
[v(Si)− v(Si−1)] = v(N)
and
ψC(r1,...,rk)(Sj) =
j∑
i=1
ψi,ri(Sj) =
j∑
i=1
ψi,ri(ri) =
j∑
i=1
[v(Si)− v(Si−1)] = v(Sj) (2)
for all Sj ∈ C.
Definition 7 Let v be a game on a k-regular set system Rk, and consider S ∈ Rk, S 6= ∅, N .
We define the lower reduced game vS and the upper reduced game v
S as follows:
(i) vS is a game defined on the subfamily R
k
S := {T ⊆ S | T ∈ R
k} by vS(T ) := v(T ), for
all T ∈ RkS.
(ii) vS is a game defined on the subfamily Rk∪S := {T ⊆ N \ S | T ∪ S ∈ R
k} by vS(T ) :=
v(T ∪ S)− v(S), for all T ∈ Rk∪S .
Rk is strongly non-degenerate (respectively, strongly balanced) if it is non-degenerate (re-
spectively, balanced), and all RkS, R
k
∪S are non-degenerate (respectively, balanced) for all
S ∈ Rk \ {∅, N}. A game v on Rk is strongly balanced if for all S ∈ Rk \ {∅, N}, the lower
and upper reduced games vS, v
S are balanced.
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Clearly, 2N is strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced. The core of a given game on
a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced set system Rk is a polytope. We can also
say that a set system Rk is strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced if, for all S ∈ Rk,
we have C(RkS) = {0} = C(R
k
∪S). Although the conditions of a strongly non-degenerate and
strongly balanced set system are very strong, we can find some examples beside Rk = 2N :
let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Rk = 2N \ {1, 3}, then it is a strongly non-degenerate and strongly
balanced set system, as it can be checked. Moreover, we have the following results.
Lemma 2 Any distributive lattice R = O(N) is strongly non-degenerate.
Proof We know from Proposition 4 that such set systems are non-degenerate. Denote by ≤
the partial order on N generating R. Let us take S ∈ R and consider RS. Then RS = O(S).
Indeed, S is a downset in the poset N , hence downsets of S (with ≤ restricted to S) coincide
with downsets of N which are subsets of S. Applying again Proposition 4, we conclude that
RS is non-degenerate.
Consider now R∪S . Then we have R∪S = O(N \ S), with the partial order ≤ restricted
to N \ S. Indeed, R∪S contains those sets T disjoint of S such that S ∪ T is a downset
of N , which is the case if and only if T is a downset of N \ S. This proves that R∪S is
non-degenerate. 
Lemma 3 There exist no set systems of the type O(N), except 2N , that are balanced.
Proof We consider a set system R = O(N) 6= 2N . We know that R is non-degenerate,
then R is balanced and non-degenerate if and only if the system x(N) = 0, x(S) ≥ 0, for
all S ∈ R has a unique solution 0. Since R 6= 2N , it exists two elements i, j in the poset N
such that i < j or i > j. We can suppose i < j. Let x ∈ Rn such that xi = 1, xj = −1 and 0
otherwise. Evidently x ∈ C(R), since x(S) = xi + xj = 0 for any S : i, j ∈ S, x(S) = xi = 1
for any S : i ∈ S, j 6∈ S and x(S) = 0 otherwise. Then 0 is not the only solution, hence R is
not balanced. 
From these two lemmas, there exist no set systems of the type O(N), except 2N , that
are strongly balanced and strongly non-degenerate.
The next lemma proves that for any set system, it is always possible to find a strongly
balanced game. Hence, it makes sense to consider strongly non-degenerate set systems and
strongly balanced games defined on them.
Lemma 4 For any k-regular set system Rk, it exists a game v for which all its lower and
upper reduced games are balanced.
Proof Since Rk is k-regular, it is ranked and therefore can be partitioned into k + 1 levels
numbered 0, 1, . . . , k, where level 0 is simply {∅}. We define a game v on Rk as follows: for
any S ∈ Rk, S 6= ∅, v(S) := nj−1 if S is in level j.
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Let us prove that vS is balanced for every S ∈ R
k, S 6= ∅, N . Suppose S is in level
ℓ. Then the vector xi :=
v(S)
|S|
for all i ∈ S belongs to the core of vS. Indeed, it satisfies
x(S) = vS(S), and for any T ∈ R
k
S in level 1 ≤ ℓ
′ < ℓ, we have
x(T ) =
nl−1|T |
|S|
≥ nℓ
′−1 = vS(T )
since |T |
|S|
≥ 1
n
≥ 1
nℓ−ℓ
′ .
Similarly, let us prove that vS is balanced. Take the vector xi :=
vS (N\S)
|N\S|
= n
k−1−nℓ−1
|N\S|
for
i ∈ N \S, which clearly satisfies x(N \S) = vS(N \S). We have for any T ∈ Rk∪S such that
T ∪ S is on level ℓ ≤ k′ < k − 1
x(T ) =
(nk−1 − nl−1)|T |
|N \ S|
≥ nk
′−1 − nl−k+k
′−1 ≥ nk
′−1 − nl−1 = vS(T ),
since |T |
|N\S|
≥ 1
n
≥ 1
nk−k
′ . 
Proposition 5 Let Rk be a k-regular lattice on N . Then Rk is strongly non-degenerate if
and only if k = n.
Proof Let N = {1, . . . , n}. The “if” part is immediate from Lemma 1 (iii) and Lemma 2.
Let us prove the “only if” part. Suppose that Rk is lattice, we prove k = n by induction
on n.
• When n = 1, it is clearly k = 1.
• Assume k = n when n ≤ m.
• Let n = m+ 1, and consider C = {∅, S1, . . . , Sk−1, Sk := N} a maximal chain of R
k.
Since Rk is strongly non-degenerate, for any strongly balanced game v, the core of the
reduced game vSk−1 defined onR1 = {∅, N\Sk−1} has vertices. It implies |N\Sk−1| = 1.
Let {i} := N \ Sk−1.
Let Rk−1 := {S ∈ Rk | S ⊆ Sk−1}, clearly, it is a (k − 1)-regular set system. The
reduced game vSk−1(S) := v(S) for all S ∈ R
k−1 is nonempty and has vertices. Since
|Sk−1| = |N \ {i}| = m, by the hypothesis, k − 1 = m = n− 1, hence k = n.

When Rk is not a lattice, we may have k < n. For example the 3-regular set system
R = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} (see Figure 1) is not a lattice, but is strongly
non-degenerate, as it can be checked.
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Theorem 5 Let Rk be a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced k-regular set system,
and let v be a strongly balanced game. Then, the core of v is included in the convex hull of
the set of marginal vectors, i.e., C(v) ⊆ W(v).
Proof We prove it by induction on the number k.
(i) Let k = 1. Because rank(A) = k = 1, then R1 := {∅, {1}}. We have
C(v) = {v(1)} and V(v,R1) = {v(1)e1 = v(1)}.
Clearly V(v,R1) is the set of vertices of C(v).
(ii) Assume that the statement is true for k : k ≤ r < n.
(iii) Suppose k = r+1. Let ψ0 be a vertex of C(v), then ∃S ∈ R
r+1 : ∅ 6= S ( N such that
ψ0(S) = v(S). Let m be the length of C, with C ∈ C∅−S(R
r+1).
Let u be a game defined on Rm := {T : T ⊆ S, T ∈ Rr+1} by u(T ) := v(T ), ∀T ∈ Rm.
Clearly Rm is an m-regular set system. We have clearly
ψS0 := ψ0|S ∈ C(u).
Let w be a game defined on Rr+1−m := {T : T ⊆ N \ S, S ∪ T ∈ Rr+1} by w(T ) :=
v(S ∪ T )− v(S), ∀T ∈ Rr+1−m. Evidently, Rr+1−m is a (r+1−m)-regular set system.
We define for any T ∈ Rr+1−m,
ψ
N\S
0 (T ) := ψ0(T ∪ S)− ψ0(S) = ψ0(T ).
It is easy to check that
ψ
N\S
0 ∈ C(w).
By induction, ψS0 ∈ conv
(
V(u,Rm)
)
and ψ
N\S
0 ∈ conv
(
V(w,Rr+1−m)
)
.
We want to prove that C(v) is included in the convex hull of V(v,Rr+1). Then we
need only to prove that any vertex of C(v) is contained in conv
(
V(v,Rr+1)
)
, that is,
ψ0 ∈ conv
(
V(v,Rr+1)
)
. Let us introduce the index sets I, J , such that C∅−S(R
m) =
{Ci : i ∈ I} and C∅−N\S(R
r+1−m) = {Cj : j ∈ J}. For any Ci, i ∈ I, we denote
elements of RCi by rip := (r
ip
1 , . . . , r
ip
m). Similarly, for any Cj , j ∈ J , all elements of RCj
are denoted by rjq := (r
jq
1 , . . . , r
jq
r+1−m). Let (r
ip, rjq) := (r
ip
1 , . . . , r
ip
m, r
jq
1 , . . . , r
jq
r+1−m).
Let P i, Qj be respectively the index sets of RC
i
, RC
j
, i.e., RC
i
:= {rip : p ∈ P i} and
RC
j
:= {rjq : q ∈ Qj}.
Since ψS0 ∈ conv
(
V(u,Rm)
)
and ψ
N\S
0 ∈ conv
(
V(w,Rr+1−m)
)
, we have
ψS0 (t) =
∑
i∈I,p∈P i
αi,pψ
Ci,rip (t), ∀t ∈ S
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with
∑
i,p αi,p = 1, αi,p ≥ 0, ψ
Ci,rip ∈ V(u,Rm), ∀i, p, and
ψ
N\S
0 (t) =
∑
j∈J,q∈Qj
βj,qψ
Cj ,rjq (t), ∀t ∈ N \ S
with
∑
j,q βj,q = 1, βj,q ≥ 0, ψ
Cj ,rjq ∈ V(w,Rr+1−m), ∀j, q.
We know that any Ci := {∅, Si1 . . . , Sim := S}, i ∈ I is also a maximal chain of
C∅−S(R
r+1) and any Cj := {∅, Sj1, . . . , Sjr+1−m := N \ S}, j ∈ J corresponds to a
maximal chain {S, Sj1 ∪ S, . . . , N} of CS−N(R
r+1). Let Ci,j := {∅, Si1, . . . , S, Sj1 ∪
S, . . . , N}. Define
ψC
i,j(rip ,rjq )(t) :=
{
ψC
i,rip (t), if t ∈ S
ψC
j ,rjq (t), if t ∈ N \ S.
Clearly, ψC
i,j(rip ,rjq ) ∈ V(v,Rr+1). Then, for any t ∈ S
ψ0(t) = ψ
S
0 (t) =
∑
i∈I,p∈P i
αi,pψ
Ci,rip (t) =
∑
i,p
αi,pψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
=
∑
j∈J,q∈Qj
βj,q
(∑
i,p
αi,pψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
)
=
∑
j,q
∑
i,p
αi,pβj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
=
∑
i,j,p,q
αi,pβj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t),
for any t ∈ N \ S
ψ0(t) = ψ
N\S
0 (t) =
∑
j∈J,q∈Qj
βj,qψ
Cj ,rjq (t) =
∑
j,q
βj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
=
∑
i,p
αi,p
(∑
j,q
βj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
)
=
∑
j,q
∑
i,p
αi,pβj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t)
=
∑
i,j,p,q
αi,pβj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq )(t),
where αi,p ≥ 0, βj,q ≥ 0, ∀i, j, p, q, and
∑
i,j,p,q αi,pβj,q =
∑
i,p αi,p
(∑
j,q βj,q
)
= 1.
That is to say ψ0 =
∑
i,j,p,q αi,pβj,qψ
Ci,j(rip ,rjq ). So ψ0 ∈ conv
(
V(v,Rr+1)
)
.
Thus, by induction, C(v) ⊆ conv
(
V(v,Rk)
)
.
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The condition that Rk is a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced k-regular
set system is necessary for this theorem. Indeed, suppose that Rk is only strongly non-
degenerate, and let ψ0 be a vertex of v. Then we cannot ensure that ψ
S
0 , ψ
N\S
0 are in the
conic part of the games u, w, that is, the result cannot hold in general. This is shown in the
next example.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. The 3-regular set system
R = {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
is strongly non-degenerate, but is not strongly balanced. Let v be the game assigning −1
for the subsets of {1, 2} and 0 otherwise. We have V(v,R) = {(−1, 0, 1), (0,−1, 1)}, and
(0, 0, 0) ∈ C(v), but (0, 0, 0) 6∈ W(v).
The conditions of the theorem appear to be rather strong, since they rule out all sets
systems of the type O(N), except 2N . However, we know from [14] that for those set systems,
the result holds, i.e., the convex part of the core is included in the Weber set.
6 The core of convex games
In this section, we give some properties about the core of convex games.
Theorem 6 Let Rk be a k-regular lattice closed under union and intersection. If v is convex,
then W(v) ⊆ C(v).
Proof It suffices to prove that V(v,Rk) ⊆ C(v). Let C := {S0 = ∅, S1, . . . , Sk = N} be a
maximal chain of the k-regular lattice Rk closed under ∪,∩. Let ψC(r1,...,rk) be a vector in
VC(v,Rk). We want to prove that ψC(r1,...,rk) ∈ C(v).
Let T 6∈ C and T ∈ Rk. Because ∅ ( T ( N , then there exists a unique smallest set Sp,
s.t. T ( Sp ∈ C, then Sp−1 ∨ T = Sp−1 ∪ T = Sp.
Sp−1 ∧ T
T Sp−1
Sp
C
we have
v(Sp−1 ∪ T ) + v(Sp−1 ∩ T ) ≥ v(Sp−1) + v(T ).
we want to prove ψC(r1,...,rk)(T ) ≥ v(T ) by induction on p ≥ 2.
If p = 2, we have v(S1 ∪ T ) + v(∅) ≥ v(S1) + v(T ). By (1), it implies ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(T ) =
ψC(r1,...,rk)(S1 ∪ T )− ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(S1) ≥ v(T ).
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If p > 2, we deduce from (1) that
ψC(r1,...,rk)(Sp−1 ∪ T ) + v(Sp−1 ∩ T ) ≥ ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(Sr) + v(T ).
By induction
ψC(r1,...,rk)(Sp−1 ∩ T ) ≥ v(Sp−1 ∩ T ).
It indicates
ψC(r1,...,rk)(Sp−1 ∪ T ) + ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(Sp−1 ∩ T ) ≥ ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(Sp−1) + v(T ).
That is,
ψC(r1,...,rk)(T ) ≥ v(T ).
Consequently we have ψC(r1,...,rk) ∈ C(v). 
We cannot get the same result for any k-regular lattice, as the following example shows.
Example 4 Consider R defined in the figure below, and put v(3) = 2, v(123) = 6, v(234) =
4, and v(12345) = 8. Then v is a convex game. The conditions for x := (xi)i=1,2,3 to be an
element of the core are:
∅
{3}
{2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3}
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
x3 ≥ 2, x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 6, x2 + x3 + x4 ≥ 4 and x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 = 8.
Let C = {∅, 3, 123, 12345} be a maximal chain of R. Then
ψC(3,1,5) := (v(123)− v(3), 0, v(3), 0, v(12345)− v(123)) = (4, 0, 2, 0, 2)
is not in the core of v.
Theorem 7 Let Rn be a n-regular lattice. If v is monotone and convex, then W(v) ⊆ C(v).
Proof The demonstration is similar to that of Th. 6. Let C := {S0 = ∅, S1, . . . , Sn = N}
be a maximal chain of the n-regular set system Rn and T ∈ Rn, T 6∈ C. Let ψC(r1,...,rn) be a
vector in VC(v,Rn). It always exists a unique smallest set Sp ∈ C, s.t. T ⊆ Sp. Moreover
since Rn is n-regular, then ∃i ∈ N s.t. Sp−1 = Sp \ {i} and T ∨ Sp−1 = Sp.
Sp−1 ∧ T
T Sp−1
Sp
C
i
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By convexity,
v(Sp−1 ∨ T ) + v(Sp−1 ∧ T ) ≥ v(Sp−1) + v(T ).
Let us prove ψC(r1,...,rn)(T ) ≥ v(T ) by induction on p ≥ 2.
If p = 2, then T = {i}, S1 = {j}, j 6= i. We have v({i, j}) + v(∅) ≥ v({j}) + v(T ). By
(1), it implies ψC(r1,...,rn)({i}) = ψC(r1,...,rn)({i, j})− ψC(r1,...,rn)({j}) ≥ v({i}).
If p > 2, we deduce from (1) that
ψC(r1,...,rn)(Sp−1 ∪ {i})− ψ
C(r1,...,rn)(Sp−1) + v(Sp−1 ∧ T ) ≥ v(T ).
i.e.,
ψC(r1,...,rn)({i}) + v(Sp−1 ∧ T ) ≥ v(T ).
By induction
ψC(r1,...,rn)(Sp−1 ∧ T ) ≥ v(Sp−1 ∧ T ).
We have
ψC(r1,...,rn)({i}) + ψC(r1,...,rn)(Sp−1 ∧ T ) ≥ v(T ).
By definition of operation ∧, ∃S− ⊆ Sp−1 ∩T , such that Sp−1 ∧ T = (Sp−1 ∩ T ) \S
−. We
have
ψC(r1,...,rn)({i}) + ψC(r1,...,rn)(Sp−1 ∩ T )− ψ
C(r1,...,rn)(S−) ≥ v(T ).
Since v is monotone, it implies ψC(r1,...,rn) ∈ Rn+. Then,
ψC(r1,...,rn)(T ) ≥ ψC(r1,...,rn)(T )− ψC(r1,...,rn)(S−) ≥ v(T ).
Hence
ψC(r1,...,rn)(T ) ≥ v(T )
Consequently we have ψC(r1,...,rn) ∈ C(v). 
Proposition 6 Let Rk be a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced k-regular set sys-
tem, and v be strongly balanced. If W(v) ⊆ C(v), then V(v,Rk) = Ext
(
C(v)
)
.
Proof By Theorem 5, when v is strongly balanced, we have C(v) ⊆ W(v), i.e., Ext
(
C(v)
)
⊆
V(v,Rk), if W(v) ⊆ C(v).
Let ψC(r1,...,rk) ∈ V(v,Rk) with C := {∅, S1, . . . , Sk := N}, then ψ
C(r1,...,rk) ∈ C(v). It
exists ψ1, ψ2 ∈ C(v), λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and λ1 + λ2 = 1 such that ψ
C(r1,...,rk) = λ1ψ
1 + λ2ψ
2. For any
i = 1, . . . , k,
λ1ψ
1(Si) + λ2ψ
2(Si) ≥ λ1v(Si) + λ2v(Si) = v(Si)
From (1), we have v(Si) = ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(Si), then ψ
1(Si) = ψ
2(Si) = v(Si) = ψ
C(r1,...,rk)(Si).
Let r ∈ N . Then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that r ∈ Sj \ Sj−1. That is,
ψC(r1,...,rk)(r) = ψ1(r) = ψ2(r). It implies ψ1 = ψ2 = ψC(r1,...,rk). Hence ψC(r1,...,rk) is a
vertex of the core, i.e., the set V(v,Rk) is the set of vertices of the core. 
From Proposition 5 and 6, and Theorems 6 and 7, we deduce:
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Corollary 1 Let Rn be a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced n-regular lattice,
and v be strongly balanced.
(i) If Rn is closed under ∪,∩ and v is convex, then V(v,Rn) = Ext(C(v)).
(ii) If v is monotone and convex, then V(v,Rn) = Ext(C(v)).
7 Comparison with distributive games
Let v be a distributive game on R := O(N). In [14], the precore of v is defined as follows.
Definition 8 The precore of a distributive game v on O(N) is defined by
PCd(v) := {ψ ∈ R
n | ψ(N) = v(N) and ψ(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ O(N)}.
Let C := {S0 := ∅, S1, . . . , Sn := N} be a maximal chain of O(N). It is associated in
a bijective way with a permutation π on N , defining the additional element between any 2
consecutive coalitions Si, Si−1 as π(i). That is, we can write
Si = {π(1), π(2), . . . , π(i)}
The pre-marginal worth vector ψπ is defined by:
ψπ(π(i)) := v(Si)− v(Si−1), i = 1, . . . , n.
The set of all pre-marginal worth vectors is denoted by PM(v).
Because there is a unique additional element between any two consecutive coalitions
Si, Si−1, any vector ψ
C(r1,...,rn) in VC(v,R) is uniquely written as
ψC(π(1),...,π(n)) = (v(S1), v(S2)− v(S1), . . . , v(Sn)− v(Sn−1))
Hence the set PM(v) is the same as V(v,R) in the case of R = O(N).
In [14], we have proved the following results.
Theorem 8 For any distributive game v, the convex part of the precore is included in the
convex hull of the set of all pre-marginal worth vectors, i.e, PCFd (v) ⊆ conv
(
PM(v)
)
.
Theorem 9 For any distributive game v, it is convex if and only if Ext(PCd(v)) = PM(v).
We can easily see that the core of games on n-regular set systems is the same as the precore
of distributive games. When R = O(N), we know from Lemma 2 that R is a strongly non-
degenerate n-regular distributive lattice. By Theorem 5, for any strongly balanced game v on
a strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced k-regular set system, C(v) ⊆ conv
(
V(v,R)
)
and by Corollary 1, V(v,R) = Ext(C(v)), hence all results for strongly non-degenerate and
strongly balanced distributive games are obtained as particular cases of games on n-regular
strongly non-degenerate and strongly balanced distributive lattices.
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Appendix A
We introduce a new method to find out all rays of a system. First, we recall a classical
process to find all rays of a system Ax = b, w ≤ x ≤ u in [5] where A, b, w, u are defined as
before.
A basic feasible partition of x is represented by the vector e = [e1, . . . , en] such that
ei = 1 if xi is basic,
ei = 0 if xi is nonbasic and x
∗
i = wi,
ei = 2 if xi is nonbasic and x
∗
i = ui.
We say that two basic feasible partitions e, e′ are neighbors of each other if there one of two
following cases happens
{
∃i s.t. ei 6= e
′
i, ei 6= 1, e
′
i 6= 1 and ej = e
′
j , ∀j 6= i,
∃i, j s.t. ei = 1, e
′
i 6= 1, ej 6= 1, e
′
j = 1 and ek = e
′
k, ∀k 6= i, j.
For a basic feasible partition e, it is very easy to find its neighbors in the first case. For
the second case, in [5], an algorithm is proposed to produce all the neighbors of a basic
feasible partition e as follows: Let x∗ be the basic feasible solution corresponding to e. We
consider some nonbasic variable xi. In Ax = b, we replace the value x
∗
i by x
∗
i + t (if x
∗
i = wi)
or by x∗i − t (if x
∗
i = ui) with t ≥ 0 but keep the values of other nonbasic variables. If t can
be arbitrarily large, then we discover a ray associated with e; otherwise, it is a neighbor of
e.
Example 5 Let
A =
(
3 1 4 1 0
4 1 5 0 1
)
, b =
(
23
25
)
, x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)
T ,
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w = (−2, 4,−∞, 0, 0)T , u = (3,+∞, 5,+∞,+∞)T .
Let e1 = (2, 0, 1, 1, 0)T be a basic feasible partition. It corresponds to the basic feasible solution
x = (3, 4, 9/5, 14/5, 0).
We begin from the nonbasic variable x1. We use x1− t instead of x1 in Ax = b. It writes{
3x1 − 3t+ x2 + 4x3 + x4 = 23
4x1 − 4t+ x2 + 5x3 + x5 = 25.
We hold x1 = 3, x2 = 4, x5 = 0. We have{
4x3 + x4 = 10 + 3t
5x3 = 9 + 4t.
Because x3 ≤ 5, x4 ≥ 0, it indicates that t ≤ 4. Let t = 4, that is, x1 enters the basis, but x3
leaves it. We get one of neighbors of e1: e2 = (1, 0, 2, 1, 0)T .
From the nonbasic variable x2, we can get similarly another neighbor of e
1: e3 = (2, 1, 1, 0, 0)T .
Now we consider the nonbasic variable x5. Replace x5 by x5 + t with t ≥ 0, but keeping
x1 = 3 and x2 = 4. We have {
5x3 = 9− t ≤ 25
5x4 = 14 + 4t ≥ 0.
Then t is not restricted and we have a ray. Let y be the ray of e1. It must satisfy y1 = y2 =
0, y5 = 1 and Ay = 0. Then y = (0, 0,−1/5, 4/5, 1)
T .
By the same way, we consider the neighbors of e2, e3 and can find all rays of Ax = b.
Because we can easily find all basic feasible partitions, we propose the following way to
simplify the above process for finding all rays. Let x∗ be the basic feasible solution of a basic
feasible partition e, J be the set of indices of all basic variables. For some nonbasic variable
xi, i 6∈ B, we take x
′
i = 1 (if x
∗
i = wi) or x
′
i = −1 (if x
∗
i = ui) and x
′
j = 0 ∀j : j 6= i, j 6∈ J .
We obtain the coordinates of x′ in J by solving the system Ax′ = 0. For any k ∈ J , if x′k ≤ 0
whenever wk = −∞ and x
′
k ≥ 0 whenever uk = +∞, then x
′ is a ray (because x∗ + tx′ is
always feasible with t ≥ 0, that is, t can be arbitrarily large); otherwise, let I be the set of
all indices of variables not satisfying these two conditions and
zk :=


uk − x
∗
k
x′k
if x′k > 0,
x∗k − wk
−x′k
if x′k < 0.
Let j be the index of the variable zj such that zj = mink∈I {zk} .
With t increasing, the variable xj achieves first its upper bound (if x
′
j > 0) or lower
bound (if x′j < 0). Hence it produces a neighbor e
∗ of the basic feasible partition e. That is,
e∗k = ek, ∀k 6= j, k 6= i, e
∗
i = 1 and e
∗
j = 0 (if x
′
j < 0) or e
∗
j = 2 (if x
′
j > 0). By this method,
we can find all neighbors of a basic feasible partition. Now we apply this method to find
again all neighbors of e1 of Example 5.
25
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.55 (Version révisée)
Example 6 We begin also from the nonbasic variable x1. Let x
′
1 = −1 (because x1 = 3 = u1)
and x′2 = 0, x
′
5 = 0. The system Ax
′ = 0 can be written as{
−3 + 4x′3 + x
′
4 = 0,
−4 + 5x′3 = 0.
We obtain x′3 = 4/5, x
′
4 = −1/5. Then x
′ is not a ray but a neighbor of e1 and I = {3, 4}.
We put that
z3 :=
u3 − x3
x′3
= 4, z4 :=
x4 − w4
−x′4
= 14.
Then j = 3. A neighbor e2 of e1 is found, it is e2 = (1, 0, 2, 1, 0)T .
For the nonbasic variable x2, similarly, let x
′
2 = 1 and x
′
1 = x
′
5 = 0. We have x
′
3 = x
′
4 =
−1/5 by Ax′ = 0. Because x′3 < 0, the set I is a singleton {4}, i.e., t = 4. Then another
neighbor e3 of e1 is e3 = (2, 1, 1, 0, 0)T .
Now we consider the last nonbasic variable x5. Let x
′
5 = 1 and x
′
1 = x
′
2 = 0. By Ax
′ = 0,
we have x′3 = −1/5, x
′
4 = 4/5. Then we obtain a ray x
′ = (0, 0,−1/5, 4/5, 1)T .
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